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PLAUSIBLY PLEADING PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Jayne S. Ressler*
Courts have wrestled for decades with the phrase "arising from or related to" in
the context of personal jurisdiction. Many courts have opted for liberal interpretations
of the phrase, hanging their personal jurisdiction hats on the slim hook of "but for, " or
even "substantial connection" analyses. In this Article, I investigate whether the recent
Supreme Court case, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, an antitrust case modifying the
pleading rules regarding the merits of an action, suggests that the Supreme Court may
have a preference for stricter pleading requirements across the board. I conclude that
it does, and argue that courts should hold plaintifs to a tighter standard when alleging
that defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in particular fora.
I also argue that Twombly gives courts guidance as to when to allow plaintiffs to
take discovery to shore up weak personal jurisdiction claims. In Twombly, the
Supreme Court expressed concern that discovery costs regarding the merits of an
action have run amok, and that this may force defendants to settle valueless claims to
avoid excessive discovery expenses. Personal jurisdiction discovery can involve similar
costs, and Twombly's message of frugality and careful review of claims should apply
with equal weight to requests for such discovery.
I conclude the Article with three recommendations: (1) that courts adhere to the
"proximate cause" test for specific jurisdiction, thus avoiding fishing expeditions and
opening the door for personal jurisdiction discovery only in those rare cases when only
the defendant has the evidence necessary to support the plaintif's assertion ofpersonal
jurisdiction; (2) that courts properly utilize the "colorable claim" requirement when
plaintiffs request discovery regarding personal jurisdiction allegations; and (3) that
the responsibility for evaluating plaintiffs' personal jurisdiction claims be delegated
initially to specialized judges or magistrates. The goal of these recommendations is to
unify a heretofore ad hoc and unpredictable process and to heed Twombly's mandate
that costs and efficiency be essential factors in judicial decision making.
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On May 21, 2007, the Supreme Court published its decision in Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly.' The case created a stir in the legal community, inspiring scholars to pen
articles and blog entries with titles such as Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now
Unconstitutionafi and The Mystery of Twombly Continues,3 and to make observations
such as "[n]otice pleading is dead." While several scholars agree that Twombly indeed
has created a procedural mystery,5 one thing is clear-Twombly has produced game-
changing implications for the pleading standards courts should employ in antitrust
matters. 6 Twombly announced a new threshold for plaintiffs seeking to plead an
antitrust claim under section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act7 by requiring antitrust
plaintiffs to provide not just conceivable but "plausible grounds to infer a[] [collusive]
agreement," and to plead a "context that raises a suggestion of a preceding [collusive]
agreement."8 Perhaps even more significantly, in Twombly 9 the Court explicitly
"retired" the pleading standard it had articulated fifty years earlier in Conley v.
Gibson,'0 when the Court held that a complaint was sufficient unless there was "no set
of facts" that could support its allegations."
1. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2. Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1851 (2008).
3. Posting of Scott Dodson to PrawfsBlawg, The Mystery of Twombly Continues, http://prawfsblawg.
blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/02/the-mystery-of.html (Feb. 5, 2008, 23:40).
4. A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 431 (2008).
5. See Ettie Ward, The After-Shocks of Twombly: Will We "Notice" Pleading Changes?, 82 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 893, 893-94 (2008) (noting difficulties circuit courts have experienced applying pleading rules after
Twombly).
6. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court Wreaks Havoc in the Lower Federal Courts-Again,
FINDLAW, Aug. 13, 2007, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20070813.html (describing confusion created by
Twombly and noting that "[t]he hundreds of lower court opinions citing Twombly take a variety of positions on
the meaning of the case"). However, the Supreme Court may have recently resolved some of the confusion
regarding Twombly in its decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). In Iqbal, the Court stated, "Our
decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for 'all civil actions,' and it applies to antitrust and
discrimination suits alike." 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (internal citation omitted).
7. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006).
8. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556-57 (2007).
9. Id. at 562-63.
10. 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
11. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46; see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944 (acknowledging Twombly Court's
dismissal of Conley's "no set of facts" pleading requirement). For a comprehensive discussion of Conley, see
Kendall W. Hannon, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact ofBell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on
12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1816-20 (2008). Just two weeks after Twombly, however,
the Supreme Court issued Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007), a per curiam reversal of a dismissal on
pleading grounds by the Tenth Circuit. Citing Twombly, the Court held that "[s]pecific facts are not necessary;
the statement need only 'give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests."' Erickson, 127 S. Ct. at 2200 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Thus, to the extent Twombly found
that Conley "ha[d] earned its retirement," Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563, the Court's opinion in Erickson clarified
that the Court was retiring only Conley's "no set of facts" language, which had been, in the Court's view,
extended well beyond its intended meaning over time. Clearly, the Court did not wholly reject notice pleading.
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The literature is rife with discussions of Twombly's impact on litigation. 12 One
commentator has gone so far as to deem the decision "poorly crafted" with "an
abundance of contradictory dicta."13 Nonetheless, as one scholar phrased it, "[a]s
matters now stand, it looks as though the decision has made a general transformation in
pleading rules in all cases, not just within the antitrust area, although only the future
will show for sure."14
What commentators have overlooked, however, is Twombly's potential impact on
how courts resolve challenges to their personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Despite
its centrality to both the state and federal court systems,15 personal jurisdiction is an
area that remains fraught with uncertainties and ambiguities.' 6 This promises to
12. See, e.g., Keith Bradley, Pleading Standards Should Not Change After Bell Atlantic v. Twombly,
102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 117, 118 (2007), http://www.law.northwestem.edullawreview/colloquy
/2007/31/ (discussing pleadings in antitrust litigation context); Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 135, 140 (2007), http://www.virginialaw
review.org/inbrief/2007/07/09/dodson.pdf (noting that "notice-plus pleading" is required for all suits); Hannon,
supra note II, at 1835 (presenting statistical analysis of 12(b)(6) motions in lower courts, pre- and post-
Twombly); Max Huffman, The Necessity ofPleading Elements in Private Antitrust Conspiracy Claims, 10 U.
PA. J. Bus. & EMP. L. 627, 657 (2008) (noting impact of Twombly pleading standard both inside and outside
antitrust context); Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle ofSubstantive Sufficiency Under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to Federal Pleading Practice, 243 F.R.D. 604, 605
(2006) (describing variations in courts' understanding of pleading requirements); Randal C. Picker, Twombly,
Leegin, and the Reshaping of Antitrust, 2007 SuP. CT. REV. 161, 172-77 (2008) (detailing post-Twombly
changes in antitrust litigation); Spencer, supra note 4, at 483 (predicting impact that plausibility pleading
requirement will have on valid claims); Thomas, supra note 2, at 1879 (explaining incongruence between new
standards for motions to dismiss, common law principles, and Seventh Amendment); Brian Thomas
Fitzsimons, Note, The Injustice of Notice & Heightened Pleading Standards for Antitrust Conspiracy Claims:
It Is Time to Balance the Scale for Plaintifs, Defendants, and Society, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 199, 224 (2007)
(arguing heightened pleading standards favor defendants); Amanda Sue Nichols, Note, Alien Tort Statute
Accomplice Liability Cases: Should Courts Apply the Plausibility Pleading Standard of Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly?, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 2177, 2221 (2008) (arguing for application of plausibility pleading standard
for Alien Tort Statute litigation); Saritha Komatireddy Tice, Recent Development, A "Plausible " Explanation
ofPleading Standards: Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), 31 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
827, 838 (2008) (explaining potential uncertainty among lower courts in applying "plausibility" standard).
13. Ides, supra note 11, at 606; see also id. (noting that, consistent with Twombly's deficiencies, "within
three months of the decision, 808 lower federal courts [sic] opinions had cited the case, often taking divergent
views of what it meant").
14. Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised)
Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 61, 64 (2007). See supra note 6 for an introduction to Iqbal.
For a further discussion of Iqbal, see Adam Liptak, 9/11 Case Could Bring Broad Shift on Civil Suits, N.Y.
TtMEs, July 21, 2009, at Al0. Appellate lawyer Thomas C. Goldstein stated that "Iqbal [was] the most
significant Supreme Court decision in a decade for day-to-day litigation in the federal courts." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Liptak paraphrased corporate defense lawyer Mark Herrmann as saying that "the
Iqbal decision will allow for the dismissal of cases that would otherwise have subjected defendants to millions
of dollars in discovery costs." Id. Civil procedure scholar Stephen B. Burbank described Iqbal as "a blank
check for federal judges to get rid of cases they disfavor." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. Cf Hannon, supra note 11, at 1811-12 (discussing fundamental role that pleadings play in operation
of federal judiciary and effects of court's pleading standards on framing issues, controlling access to discovery,
and shaping settlement proceedings).
16. See infra Part III for a discussion of the problems that arise in applying personal jurisdiction law. See
also Lee Scott Taylor, Note, Registration Statutes, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Problem of Predictability,
103 COLUM. L. REv. 1163, 1163-64 (2003) (discussing uncertainties surrounding law of personal jurisdiction).
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become even more so with the emergence of global trade and the universality of the
Internet.' 7 Puzzlingly, the Supreme Court has not yet explained the proper
interpretation of the specific jurisdiction requirement that a defendant's contacts with
the forum "arise from or relate to" a plaintiffs claim. Indeed one scholar has posited
that the Supreme Court's personal jurisdiction doctrine is incoherent and "deeply
fragmented.""
As a consequence, courts have devised various tests to determine when a cause of
action "arises from or is related to" the defendant's presence in the jurisdiction, thereby
conferring specific jurisdiction over that defendant." As I explain in this Article,
17. See, e.g., Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 451-53 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting changes
in courts' guidelines for personal jurisdiction given rise of Internet).
18. Wendy Collins Perdue, Personal Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C. L. REv. 529, 530
(1991).
19. In an arena employing similar verbiage, but not implicating personal jurisdiction directly, discussions
regarding a possible distinction between "arising out of' and "related to" frequently arise in the context of the
interpretation of arbitration agreements. For example, clauses including all claims or controversies "arising out
of' the subject contract have been considered by some courts to be narrow in scope, i.e., the scope of the
arbitration clause is limited to those claims having some direct relation to the terms and provisions of the
contract. See Mediterranean Enters., Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1464 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting that
"arising hereunder" covers narrower field of arbitration disputes than "arising out of or relating to"); In re
Kinoshita & Co., 287 F.2d 951, 953 (2d Cir. 1961) (noting parties' deviation from standard "arising out of or
relating to" language limited applicability of arbitration clause). Both Mediterranean and Kinoshita hold that
claims alleging breach of a separate and unrelated contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and quantum meruit,
none of which rely on the interpretation or performance of the contract containing the arbitration clause, are
not subject to arbitration as disputes "arising out of' the contract. These cases reason that where an arbitration
clause refers solely to disputes or controversies "under" or "arising out of' the contract, arbitration is restricted
to claims "relating to the interpretation of the contract and matters of performance." Mediterranean, 708 F.2d
at 1464 (quoting Kinoshita, 287 F.2d at 953). On the other hand, the phrase "arising out of or relating to" the
contract has been interpreted broadly to encompass virtually all disputes between the contracting parties,
including related tort claims. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15 n.7 (1984) (involving claims for
fraud, misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of state franchise
investment law); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 406 (1967) (holding that
contractual language "[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement, or the breach
thereof' is "easily broad enough to encompass" claim for fraud in inducement of contract (internal quotation
marks omitted)). The addition of the phrase "relating to" to the phrases "arising out of' or "under" has been
construed as broadening the scope of the arbitration provision. See Am. Recovery Corp. v. Computerized
Thermal Imaging, Inc., 96 F.3d 88, 93 (4th Cir. 1996) (characterizing phrase "arising out of or relating to" as
broad arbitration clause "capable of an expansive reach").
According to David Zaring's posting on The Conglomerate, a blog devoted to "Business, Law,
Economics & Society," a similar controversy confounded the British legal system until recently. Posting of
David Zaring to The Conglomerate, News for Arbitration Fans, http://www.theconglomerate.org/2007
/10/news-for-arbitr.html (Oct. 18, 2007). Zaring writes that the "'arising under' language in contracts has been
more narrowly tailored in the UK than 'arising out of or related to' language-which meant there was more
scope to go straight to court if the 'arising under' language appeared in the dispute settlement part of the
contract." Id Lord Hoffman resolved that controversy, however, holding:
[T]he construction of an arbitration clause should start from the assumption that the parties, as
rational businessmen, are likely to have intended any dispute arising out of the relationship into
which they have entered or purported to enter to be decided by the same tribunal. The clause should
be construed in accordance with this presumption unless the language makes it clear that certain
questions were intended to be excluded from the arbitrator's jurisdiction.
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Twombly implicitly sanctions the strictest of these tests, the "proximate cause" test.20
Further, plaintiffs whose claims of jurisdiction over a defendant are challenged are
likely to seek personal jurisdiction discovery, and courts have had to improvise
standards when determining whether to permit such discovery. Twombly endorses the
heightened threshold underlying the "colorable claim" requirement courts have devised
to screen requests for personal jurisdiction discovery.2 1
Given the contradictory nature of the tests for personal jurisdiction and for
permitting personal jurisdiction discovery, and the inconsistent decisions that can flow
from that state of affairs, this direction from the Supreme Court is welcome. Twombly
implicitly recognizes a spectrum along which courts can judge the sufficiency of
pleadings and motions, 22 and inspires the lower courts to factor the cost, efficiency, and
complexity of discovery into their evaluation of a defendant's contacts with the forum
state.
Courts are routinely faced with setting litigation thresholds; the requirement that
the court have jurisdiction over the parties is one such threshold. Setting thresholds
inevitably involves tradeoffs. When courts make it easier to bring a lawsuit, they also
increase the number of frivolous suits leaking into the system; when they make it
harder, they also make it harder for some valid suits to be brought. Summary judgment
procedures are the predominant mechanism for screening out invalid lawsuits, but
summary judgment occurs late in the litigation process, after the litigants have incurred
significant costs and after much valuable court time has been expended. This situation,
combined with recognition of the increasing expense of litigation, has spurred many to
look for an earlier screening mechanism. In Twombly, the Supreme Court endorsed one
such method by imposing a heightened pleading standard on antitrust claims, and-
since personal jurisdiction requirements are akin to pleading standards in that both are
screening mechanisms-implicitly suggested that this mechanism could be applied to
personal jurisdiction issues as well.
In this Article, I invoke the insights of Twombly and apply them to the vexing
problem of personal jurisdiction. In Part II, I contemplate the lessons of Twombly for
personal jurisdiction on a general level. In Part III, I discuss the "arises from or related
to" conundrum of personal jurisdiction. "Arise from" and "related to" are inherently
ambiguous terms, causing courts to employ a variety of measures to determine the
sufficiency, for personal jurisdiction purposes, of a defendant's contacts with a
particular forum. Here I evaluate the conflicting standards that have emerged from the
various courts of appeals for determining when a court has specific jurisdiction over a
defendant. In Part IV, I review Twombly in greater detail, particularly those parts of the
decision that evince policy concerns-specifically, a desire for more efficient, cost-
effective pleading. Although the Twombly decision speaks directly to merit pleading
Premium Nafta Prods. Ltd. v. Fili Shipping Co. [2007] UKHL 40 (appeal taken from Eng.), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldjudgmt/jdO7lO17/ship-1.htm.
20. See infra Part lIl.C for a discussion of the proximate cause test.
21. See infra notes 171-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the colorable claim requirement
and its comportment with Twombly.
22. See infra Part I for a discussion of Twombly's effect on personal jurisdiction standards and Part III
for a discussion of the range of analyses courts employ for judging the sufficiency of pleadings.
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rather than personal jurisdiction, Twombly's emphasis on costs and efficiency offers an
excellent solution to the problem of inefficient and costly personal jurisdiction
determinations. In Part V, I discuss courts' various and far-from-uniform responses to
motions for personal jurisdiction discovery, and show how the "colorable claim"
requirement anticipates Twombly's mandate. Finally, in Part VI, I propose that
plaintiffs' requests for personal jurisdiction discovery be channeled to magistrates or
specialized judges. That way, a process that has traditionally been ad hoc and
unpredictable can become more streamlined and economical.
II. TWOMBLY'S PERSONAL JURISDICTION LESSONS
The decision in Twombly is premised on the notion that the specificity of
allegations contained in pleadings can be plotted on a spectrum with "conceivable" on
one end, as the most permissive standard, and "plausible" on the other end, as the most
restrictive.23 According to Twombly, the notice pleading standard appears to permit
pleadings to fall anywhere along that spectrum, but such generosity must give way to
modem realities, including the high cost of litigation, particularly that of discovery. 24
These costs create a potential for avaricious and unscrupulous plaintiffs and their
counsel to plead a "conceivable" set of facts even with a nonmeritorious claim, and
then use the potential of astronomical defense fees to force the defendant to settle.25
The Twombly Court observed that "it is one thing to be cautious before dismissing
an antitrust complaint in advance of discovery, but quite another to forget that
proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive." 26 And while the discovery phase
23. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (holding that complaint must cross "line
from conceivable to plausible" in order to survive motion to dismiss); id. at 574-75 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that majority's holding signaled return to difficult-to-administer .'spectrum' of facts and
conclusions that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had sought to eliminate (quoting Jack B. Weinstein &
Daniel H. Distler, Comments on Procedural Reform: Drafting Pleading Rules, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 518, 520-
21 (1957))).
24. The citations that the Court used to show the high cost of litigation are focused almost exclusively on
discovery costs. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (noting "extensive scope of discovery in antitrust cases" (citing
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 30 (2004))); id. (summarizing finding that use of discovery
"accounts for as much as 90 percent of litigation costs" (citing Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair,
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to Honorable Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and
Procedure (May 11, 1999), reprinted in 192 F.R.D. 354, 357 (2000))). The Court also noted the "unusually
high cost of discovery in antitrust cases." Id at 558 (citing William H. Wagener, Note, Modeling the Effect of
One-Way Fee Shifting on Discovery Abuse in Private Antitrust Litigation, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1887, 1898-99
(2003)); see also Wagener, supra, at 1898-99 (arguing that antitrust plaintiff has tactical advantage in
determining scope of discovery). The Court expressly cited discovery abuse and the alleged inability of judges
to control discovery as reasons to insist on heightened pleading when the costs of discovery are high.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REv. 635, 638
(1989)). However, Professor Cavanagh has criticized this aspect of the opinion for relying too heavily on the
Easterbrook article, stating that the assertions are "contrary to fact" and do not account for recent innovations
in the tools that judges have at their disposal to control discovery. Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Courts, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 877, 879, 882-89 (2008).
25. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559. See also infra notes 138-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the intersection of pleading rules and discovery costs.
26. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558. Twombly also reminds us that costly discovery is not a recent
development: twenty-five years ago, in 1984, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit observed that "the
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of a lawsuit remains the most expensive and the most subject to abuse by unscrupulous
plaintiffs' lawyers seeking to extort a settlement of a weak claim, 27 discovery is not
conducive to effective judicial management of litigation, as the Twombly Court
recognized.28 Indeed, the Supreme Court has observed that "the success of judicial
supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side." 29
Thus, the concept of plausibility lies at the heart of the Twombly decision. The
Court emphasized this notion when it repeated the oft-noted observation that, assuming
that all the allegations in the complaint are true, these "[fjactual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level."30 The Court noted that
plausibility "calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will
reveal evidence of [the alleged] illegal agreement."3 1 In the antitrust context explored
in Twombly, an allegation of parallel conduct "gets the complaint close to stating a
claim, but without some further factual enhancement it stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of 'entitle[ment] to relief."' 32 In another context, the
Supreme Court has observed that "something beyond the mere possibility of loss
causation must be alleged"33 in order for a claim to meet the threshold requirement of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).
What then does Twombly teach us about allegations of personal jurisdiction? The
Court makes clear that "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions."34 Since allegations of
personal jurisdiction are indeed legal conclusions, the same concerns motivating the
costs of modem federal antitrust litigation and the increasing caseload of the federal courts counsel against
sending the parties into discovery when there is no reasonable likelihood that the plaintiffs can construct a
claim from the events related in the complaint." Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th
Cir. 1984).
27. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 363 n.1 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring) (noting danger
that costs of litigation and discovery can outweigh interest in litigating meritorious claims or defenses); see
also Marc Galanter, A World Without Trials?, 2006 J. DisP. RESOL. 7, 31 (explaining that high costs of
litigation are one reason fewer trials occur); Ben Walther, Note, Employment Agreements and Tender Offers:
Reforming the Problematic Treatment of Severance Plans Under Rule 14d-10, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 774, 783
(2002) (explaining great economic costs of 14d-10 litigation, especially when meritless suits reach discovery
stage).
28. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (citing Easterbrook, supra note 24, at 638 (observing judges' inability to
prevent "impositional discovery" because parties control legal claims)).
29. Ashcroft v. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559) (internal
quotation marks omitted); Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90, 97 (2009)
(noting that judges try to maintain efficiency in litigation process, often by simply insisting that parties resolve
pretrial disputes). Moreover, discovery abuses generally fall into two categories: (1) excessive discovery
requests used to impose excessive costs (usually utilized by plaintiffs), and (2) resistance of legitimate
discovery requests to avoid disclosure or buy time (usually utilized by defendants). PEGGY E. BRUGGMAN,
REDUCING THE COSTS OF CIVIL LITIGATION: DISCOVERY REFORM 1 (1995), available at http://w3.uchastings.
edu/plri/fal95tex/discov.html; see also Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research on
Civil Discovery, 39 B.C. L. REv. 785, 799-804 (1998) (discussing various types of discovery abuses).
30. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1216, at 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)).
31. Id at 556.
32. Id at 557 (citing DM Research, Inc. v. Coll. of Am. Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53, 56 (1st Cir. 1999)).
33. Id at 557-58 (citing Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)).
34. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
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Twombly Court's decision regarding the sufficiency of the allegations regarding the
merits of a case should apply to claims of personal jurisdiction as well. Although
personal jurisdiction inquiries may not incur the same enormous costs as can discovery
in antitrust actions, they are nonetheless expensive.35 Thus, Twombly aids the courts by
stressing the need for efficiency and cost-effectiveness in all jurisdictional inquiries,
and invites application of the plausibility requirement to claims of personal jurisdiction.
III. THE PROBLEM: ASSESSING JURISDICTION BASED ON CONTACTS "ARISING FROM OR
RELATED To" THE FORUM
It is axiomatic that a court must have personal jurisdiction over a defendant to
hear a claim and rule on its merits. 36 By applying the "conceivable/permissive -
plausible/strict" spectrum articulated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly37 to personal
jurisdiction discovery, courts can more efficiently assess both (1) claims of personal
jurisdiction and (2) requests for personal jurisdiction discovery.
The accepted analytical framework to examine claims of personal jurisdiction
recognizes two different types of personal jurisdiction: specific jurisdiction and general
jurisdiction.38 With the latter, jurisdiction arises when a defendant has "purposefully
availed itself' of the privilege of doing business in the forum state, and has "continuous
and systematic general business contacts with the forum," but those contacts need not
be related to the controversy.39 With this type of personal jurisdiction, the court can
35. See, e.g., Trippe S. Fried, Maintaining the Home Court Advantage: Forum Shopping and the Small
Business Client, 6 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 419, 431 (2005) (explaining that successful personal
jurisdiction defenses raise plaintiffs' costs); Walter W. Heiser, A "Minimum Interest" Approach to Personal
Jurisdiction, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 915, 932 (2000) (noting that U.S. Supreme Court has identified travel
costs, attorneys' costs, and participation in discovery as burdens in personal jurisdiction context); Emil
Petrossian, In Pursuit of the Perfect Forum: Transnational Forum Shopping in the United States and England,
40 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1257, 1309 (2007) (noting litigation advantages of engaging in personal jurisdiction
discovery for defendants with greater financial resources attempting to dry out weaker plaintiffs' resources).
36. See, e.g., I.B. Diffusion L.P. v. Lands' End, Inc., No. 94 C 3331, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5813, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 1995) (observing personal jurisdiction requirement and rule that federal court has personal
jurisdiction over defendant only if state court would have personal jurisdiction); Crane v. Battelle, 127 F.R.D.
174, 176 (S.D. Cal. 1989) (observing basic due process requirement of personal jurisdiction for court to hear
suit against defendant).
37. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). See infra Part III for a discussion of the tests courts apply along the
conceivability to plausibility spectrum for personal jurisdiction.
38. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8-9 (1984)
(distinguishing specific and general jurisdiction); Dever v. Hentzen Coatings, Inc., 380 F.3d 1070, 1073 (8th
Cir. 2004) (identifying differences between specific and general jurisdiction); Thompson v. Chrysler Motors
Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1170 (5th Cir. 1985) (observing importance of distinguishing between specific and
general jurisdiction).
39. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 420 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 415-16 (majority opinion); see also
Dever, 380 F.3d at 1073 (observing that general jurisdiction permits jurisdiction over defendant who has
pervasive contacts with forum state, even if dispute did not arise from contacts); ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital
Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 712 (4th Cir. 2002) (same); United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274
F.3d 610, 619 (1st Cir. 2001) (same).
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thus proceed based on the defendant's continuous contacts with the forum, even though
the suit itself does not "arise out of' nor is it "related to" those continuous contacts. 40
Where a defendant's contacts with the forum are not "systematic and continuous,"
a court may still exercise personal jurisdiction if the court determines that it has
specific jurisdiction over the defendant. 41 The issue of "arising out of or related to"
arises largely in the context of specific jurisdiction, and it is in this context that
Twombly provides much-needed guidance.42
Courts employ a three-pronged test to determine whether sufficient contacts exist
to confer specific jurisdiction.43 First, courts look at whether or not the cause of action
"arise[s] out of or relate[s] to" the defendant's contacts with the forum." Second,
courts look to see whether the defendant purposefully availed itself of the benefits of
the forum state and therefore can be said to have reasonably anticipated being haled
into court in that forum.45 Third, in what is often called the "reasonableness
requirement," courts look to whether granting jurisdiction comports with "fair play and
substantial justice." 46
The first prong of this analytical framework is the one that has troubled courts and
scholars the most, and it is here that consistency breaks down. This is the step,
however, over which Twombly can shine considerable light. The "arises out of or
40. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.9 ("When a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in
a suit not arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum, the State has been said to be
exercising 'general jurisdiction' over the defendant."); Dever, 380 F.3d at 1073 ("Under the theory of general
jurisdiction, a court may hear a lawsuit against a defendant who has 'continuous and systematic' contacts with
the forum state, even if the injuries at issue in the lawsuit did not arise out of the defendant's activities directed
at the forum." (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416)).
41. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980) (stating
manufacturer or distributor may be subject to suit in state where sale arises from efforts to serve market of
state).
42. See RAR, Inc. v. Turner Diesel, Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272, 1277 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that general
jurisdiction applies only to suits "neither arising out of nor related to" nonresident defendant's contacts with
forum and "is permitted only where the defendant has 'continuous and systematic general business contacts'
with the forum," and that specific jurisdiction refers to personal jurisdiction in suit "'arising out of or related to
the defendant's contacts with the forum"' (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8, 416)); Bell Paper Box,
Inc. v. U.S. Kids, Inc., 22 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 1994) (same). Of course, Twombly's mandate applies only to
federal courts. States are free to employ, and indeed do employ, their own mechanisms for screening
allegations of personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (2009) (setting out requirements for state to
exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-1-124 (2009) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-75.4 (2009) (same). It is beyond the scope of this Article to examine each of the states' various procedural
permutations. But, as one scholar noted, "although the full impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on federal
pleading standards remains to be seen, that decision has the potential to create real inconsistencies between
state and federal pleading standards." Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean
for the Contemporary Politics ofJudicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 281-82 (2008).
43. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 317 (3d Cir. 2007) (setting out
purposeful availment, "arise out of or relate to," and due process prongs); Phillips Exeter Acad. v. Howard
Phillips Fund, Inc., 196 F.3d 284, 288 (1st Cir. 1999) (same).
44. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253
(1958); Phillips Exeter Acad, 196 F.3d at 288; Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 991 F.2d 1195, 1199 (4th Cir.
1993).
45. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472; Phillips Exeter Acad, 196 F.3d at 288.
46. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476; Phillips Exeter Acad, 196 F.3d at 288.
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related to" language is ambiguous, and, before Twombly, the Supreme Court had not
afforded the lower courts direction to interpret it. 47 The lower courts have been left
with the difficult task of interpreting this critical phrase and have come to inconsistent
conclusions when doing so.48
Over time, absent any guidance from the highest court and in their search for a
satisfactory introductory step in the analytical framework, courts have devised roughly
three different tests in interpreting whether or not a claim "arises out of or relate[s] to"
the defendant's contacts with the forum: (1) a "but for" test, (2) a "substantial
connection" test, and (3) a "proximate cause" test.49 The first and third tests, which are
grounded in causation theory, both focus on evaluating when a claim "arises out of' a
contact, while the second test focuses on whether the claim and contact are sufficiently
"related to" each other. As detailed in the following discussion, one could place the
tests along Twombly's conceivable/permissive - plausible/strict spectrum, with the
substantial connection test in the middle.
A. The "But For" Test
Under the "but for" test, the most permissive of the tests, a cause of action "arises
out of or relates to" a defendant's contacts with the forum if, but for those activities, the
cause of action would not have arisen.50 "Rather than considering only isolated contacts
that relate to a specific element of proof or the proximate cause of injury, the but for
analysis considers jurisdictional contacts that occur over the 'entire course of events' of
the relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation."51
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has favored the but for test as the
first step in the analytical framework. For example, in Deluxe Ice Cream Co. v. R.C.H.
Tool Corp., 52 Bates was in the business of locating ice cream machinery for users of
47. See, e.g., Sandy Lane, 496 F.3d at 318 (lamenting that Supreme Court had not "explained the scope"
of purposeful availment requirement). Some courts have stated that the disjunctive phrasing "arise out of or
relate to" itself implies a "flexib[le]" and "relax[ed]" standard. E.g., Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1547
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting Ticketmaster-N.Y., Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 206 (1st Cir. 1994)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court, however, has urged against attaching any significance to its use
of the disjunctive, emphasizing:
We do not address . . . . whether the terms "arising out of" and "related to" describe different
connections . . . . Nor do we reach the question whether, if the two types of relationship differ, a
forum's exercise of personal jurisdiction in a situation where the cause of action "relates to," but
does not "arise out of," the defendant's contacts with the forum should be analyzed as an assertion
of specific jurisdiction.
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415 n.l0.
48. See Sandy Lane, 496 F.3d at 318 (noting "divergent interpretations of 'arise out of or relate to'
phrase in specific jurisdiction analysis (quoting Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 102-05 (3d Cir.
2004) (Scirica, J., dissenting in part)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
49. Id. at 318-20.
50. See Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385-86 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding Carnival's
solicitation of business in Washington was "but for" cause of plaintiffs fall on Carnival cruise ship in
international waters), rev'don other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
51. Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 580 (Tex. 2007) (quoting Shute, 897 F.2d at
384).
52. 726 F.2d 1209 (7th Cir. 1984).
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such equipment, and met with the plaintiff in the forum state, Illinois, offering to help
the plaintiff find equipment.53 Bates then connected the plaintiff with SMW, a supplier
of the equipment that plaintiff sought. 54 After the plaintiff experienced problems with
the equipment that he bought from SMW, he brought suit against both Bates and SMW
in the Northern District of Illinois.ss In evaluating whether it had jurisdiction over
Bates, the court reasoned that since the "contract under which the plaintiff is suing for
breach of warranty . .. lies in the wake of Bates's commercial activities in [the forum],"
Bates was amenable to suit in the forum.56 Although the Seventh Circuit used different
verbiage, its choice of phrase-"lies in the wake of'-operates in the same fashion as
the but for test: but for Bates's activities in the forum, the plaintiff would not have
entered into the ill-fated contract.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit used the but for test more recently in
Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines.s" In that case, the plaintiff brought suit in the Western
District of Washington, her home state, seeking compensation for injuries she allegedly
received when she slipped and fell aboard one of the defendant's cruise ships, which
she had boarded in California.58 In response, the defendant-cruise line sought to
enforce the forum selection clause, set forth in the cruise ticket, which required that all
suits be brought in Florida, Carnival's home state.59
Employing the but for test, the Ninth Circuit held that the forum selection clause
was unenforceable and the plaintiff could proceed with her action in Washington. 60
According to the Ninth Circuit, but for the defendant's advertising and sale of the ticket
in Washington, the plaintiff would not have been injured, and the cause of action would
not have arisen. 61 Because of that but for relationship, the court found that personal
jurisdiction over the defendant-cruise ship line existed in Washington. 62
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Shute dramatically illustrates the broad and
sweeping nature of the but for test and how it can sometimes lead to an excessive, and
even illogical, assumption of personal jurisdiction. In Shute, the Ninth Circuit assumed
that the plaintiff was in Washington State when she saw the advertisements and bought
the cruise ship ticket.63 In the modern era of global telecommunications, however,
having jurisdiction turn on where a plaintiff sat when she saw an advertisement and
made a purchase could conceivably confer jurisdiction in any location where a person
sees a television commercial, hears a radio jingle, visits a website, or reads a print
53. Deluxe, 726 F.2d at 1210-11.
54. Id at 2111.
55. Id at 1212.
56. Id. at 1216 (emphasis added).
57. 897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'don other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
58. Shute, 897 F.2d at 379.
59. Id
60. Id at 385-86.
61. Id. at 386.
62. Id. The Supreme Court later reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the forum selection clause was
enforceable for other reasons. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 596-97 (1991). The Court
declined to address the plaintiffs constitutional argument as to personal jurisdiction, since the forum selection
clause was dispositive. Id. at 589.
63. Shute, 897 F.2d at 386.
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advertisement. This result contravenes the spirit of Twombly and its theme of
containing the excesses of modern litigation.
Few courts beyond the Ninth Circuit have adopted the but for approach, however,
and the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have signaled a movement away from such a broad
test.64 The Fifth Circuit used the but for test in Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc. ,'65 but has
since employed the substantial connection test.66
Consistent with the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has recognized that, because of the "overinclusive[ness]" of the but for test, it
"cannot be the sole measure of relatedness." 67 According to the Third Circuit:
The problem is that [the but for test] "has . . . no limiting principle; it
literally embraces every event that hindsight can logically identify in the
causative chain." If but-for causation sufficed, then defendants' jurisdictional
obligations would bear no meaningful relationship to the scope of the
"benefits and protection" received from the forum. As a result, the
relatedness inquiry cannot stop at but-for causation.
Indeed, even courts that embrace the but-for test recognize its
overinclusiveness. These courts fall back on the third step of the [personal
jurisdiction] analysis-whether jurisdiction is otherwise fair and
reasonable-to protect against the but-for test's causative excesses. But-for
causation, however, may have more holes than the third step can plug. Once
the plaintiff proves minimum contacts, the court may consider whether the
defendant has "present[ed] a compelling case that the presence of some other
considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable." Moreover, even if
the third step is up to the task, courts cannot elide relatedness simply because
the jurisdictional inquiry has a third component. Relatedness is an
independent constitutional mandate, and some but-for causes do not relate to
their effects in a jurisdictionally significant way.68
B. The "Substantial Connection" Test
The "substantial connection" test, which falls at the midpoint of Twombly's
spectrum, is essentially the "related to" component of the specific jurisdiction
64. See Felch v. Transportes Lar-Mex SA de CV, 92 F.3d 320, 324 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding no specific
jurisdiction over Mexican trucking company that was sued in Texas when truck hit plaintiffs mother's vehicle
on Mexican highway); Gorman v. Grand Casino of La., Inc.-Coushatta, I F. Supp. 2d 656, 658 (E.D. Tex.
1998) (holding plaintiff's claim of sexual assault by casino employee did not support specific jurisdiction
because claim did not arise out of casino's extensive advertising in Texas but arose from casino's Louisiana
operations); Luna v. Compania Panamena de Aviacion, S.A., 851 F. Supp. 826, 832 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (holding
no specific jurisdiction in Texas because plaintiffs death in plane crash over Panama "did not result from the
fact that she purchased the ticket for her airline travel in Texas"); Kervin v. Red River Ski Area, Inc., 711 F.
Supp. 1383, 1389 (E.D. Tex. 1989) (holding plaintiffs could not assert specific jurisdiction over nonresident
ski resort because their negligence claim did not arise out of its advertising contacts with Texas but arose as
result of resort's alleged negligence in failing to maintain safe premises in New Mexico).
65. 652 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1981).
66. See, e.g., Felch, 92 F.3d at 324 (finding no specific jurisdiction because connection between forum-
related activities and cause of action was not strong enough). See infra Part III.B for a discussion of the
substantial connection test.
67. O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 322 (3d Cir. 2007).
68. Id. at 322-23 (citations omitted).
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language. The test asks "whether the tie between the defendant's contacts and the
plaintiff s claim is close enough to make jurisdiction fair and reasonable."69 There is no
requirement that the claim formally "arise from" the defendant's contacts with the
forum; rather there only needs to be a strong connection between the two.7 0
Unlike the but-for test, [under the substantial connection test] causation is of
no special importance. The critical question is whether the tie between the
defendant's contacts and the plaintiffs claim is close enough to make
jurisdiction fair and reasonable. Because courts that follow this approach
consider the totality of the circumstances, there appears to be no rigid
distinction between general and specific jurisdiction. Instead, the two
categories sit at "opposite ends of [a] sliding scale." The degree of
relatedness required in a given case is inversely proportional to the overall
"intensity of [the defendant's] forum contacts.""
The substantial connection test has found favor in the Sixth Circuit. In Third
National Bank v. WEDGE Group Inc.,72 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
ruled that only a substantial connection is needed to confer specific jurisdiction. 3 The
parties in that case included Third National Bank, which was located in Tennessee;
WEDGE, a large Delaware corporation with its principle place of business in Texas;
and the Rogers Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of WEDGE that had its principal
place of business in Tennessee. 74 WEDGE employees served as Rogers's officers and
met regularly with Rogers personnel in Tennessee.75 Third National made loans to
Rogers and acquired a security interest in Rogers's accounts receivable.76 Rogers and
WEDGE then entered into a "Tax Sharing Agreement" in Texas, whereby WEDGE
would be liable to pay Rogers's federal income tax.77 Third National and Rogers later
renewed their loan on account of WEDGE having deposited money in Third National
Bank, located in Tennessee.78 When Rogers began to suffer financial difficulties,
WEDGE sought to sell its interest in the company, but disputes arose regarding
WEDGE's liabilities to Rogers under the tax-sharing agreement. 79 The three parties
thereupon met in Tennessee to execute a new agreement, which temporarily resolved
the issue.80
69. Id at 319.
70. See, e.g., In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz, 699 F.2d 909, 917 (7th Cir. 1983) (requiring that forum
contacts be "critical steps in the chain of events that led to the [injury]").
71. Sandy Lane, 496 F.3d at 319-20 (citations omitted).
72. 882 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1989).
73. Third Nat? Bank, 882 F.2d at 1090 ("Jurisdiction is proper, however, where the contacts proximately
result from actions by the defendant himself that create a 'substantial connection' with the forum State" (citing
McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)).









Shortly thereafter Rogers defaulted on its loan obligations to Third National
Bank."' Among Rogers's assets was the money owed to it by WEDGE under the tax-
sharing agreement. 82 Seeking to enforce its security interest in that account receivable,
Third National brought suit against WEDGE in Tennessee. 83 In response, WEDGE
argued that Tennessee did not have personal jurisdiction over it: since the tax-sharing
agreement was executed in Texas and governed by Texas law, the claims did not
formally "arise out of' its contacts with Tennessee. 84
Disagreeing, the Sixth Circuit held that a defendant's in-state activities must have
a "substantial connection" with the plaintiffs cause of action, but they need not
formally give rise to it." Using this substantial connection test, the court pointed to
WEDGE's deposits in a Tennessee bank, its negotiations with Rogers and Third
National in Tennessee, and its agreements with the two parties made in Tennessee, and
ultimately upheld personal jurisdiction over WEDGE. 86 The court explained that
specific jurisdiction's relatedness element "does not require that the cause of action
formally 'arise from' defendant's contacts with the forum," but instead requires "'that
the cause of action, of whatever type, have a substantial connection with the
defendant's in-state activities.' "87
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has taken a similar approach. In the
Eighth Circuit, courts are advised to weigh "'the nature and quality of the contacts, and
[their] source and connection' to 'the cause of action."' 88 In Miller v. Nippon Carbon
Co.,89 the plaintiff, a worker's widow, filed a wrongful death suit against the defendant,
a Japanese corporation, seeking to hold it liable for the worker's death, which occurred
while the worker was in Tennessee unloading electrodes manufactured by the
defendant in Japan. 90 The District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas dismissed
the suit on the ground that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant-Japanese
corporation.9 1
Affirming, the Eighth Circuit first observed that, with respect to the nature and
quality of the contacts with Arkansas, the defendant's contacts were limited.
Nippon is not licensed to do business in Arkansas and has no agents, offices,
employees, or property in Arkansas. Nippon contends its contacts of selling
electrodes to [its customer] Nucor and sending two representatives to visit
Nucor in Arkansas once or twice a year do not constitute contacts from




84. Id. at 1091.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id (quoting S. Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 384 n.27 (6th Cir. 1968) (emphasis
added)).
88. Lakin v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 712 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Aftanase v. Econ. Baler
Co., 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th Cir. 1965)).
89. 528 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 2008).
90. Miller, 528 F.3d at 1089.
9 1. Id.
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shipping, loading or unloading the electrodes, thus, it was not involved in the
event that caused Mr. Miller's death. According to Nippon, the packaging,
shipping, loading and unloading of the electrodes were performed by
subcontractors. Nippon emphasizes that when Mr. Miller unloaded the
electrodes, he was following orders from his employer, Global Material
Services, not from Nippon. Therefore, Nippon asserts its contacts with
Arkansas are not enough to establish that Miller's claims arise from those
contacts. 92
The Eighth Circuit concluded that
although Nippon sold electrodes to an Arkansas corporation pursuant to a
sales contract, and Nippon's representatives visited Arkansas once or twice
per year, these contacts do not sufficiently, for due process purposes, relate
to the packing, shipping and unloading of the electrodes, the events which
allegedly gave rise to Miller's cause of action. 93
A California case also illustrates the operation of the substantial connection test. In
Vons Cos. v. Seabest Foods, Inc.,94 the California Supreme Court determined that a
"claim need not arise directly from the defendant's forum contacts ... to warrant the
exercise of specific jurisdiction. Rather, as long as the claim bears a substantial
connection to the nonresident's forum contacts, the exercise of specific jurisdiction is
appropriate."95
The plaintiffs in Vons were restaurant franchisees whose hamburgers caused
E. coli illnesses in California.96 In California they sued two parties: the franchisor and
the hamburger supplier. 97 After the supplier impleaded other franchisees that were
located in Washington and sued them for negligence and indemnification, the issue was
whether the California court had jurisdiction over these impleaded parties.98 The
supplier argued that, had the Washington franchisees followed protocol, the
hamburgers would not have been infected with E. coli.99 The Washington-based
franchisees' contacts with California included food purchases from California
suppliers, the transmission of funds to California, the inspection of the franchisees'
restaurants by California-based inspectors, and the negotiation of the franchise
agreements in California.100 Although the impleaded franchisees' contacts were not
directly related to the cause of action, the court found personal jurisdiction existed
because the forum contacts bore a substantial relation to the cause of action.10
Thus, under the substantial connection test, a claim need not arise from the
defendant's actions in the forum, but merely needs to be connected to those actions.
Some scholars have criticized the test as erasing the distinction between general
92. Id. at 1091.
93. Id. at 1092 .
94. 926 P.2d 1085 (Cal. 1996).
95. Vons, 926 P.2d at 1096.




100. Id. at 1090.
101. Id. at 1101-02.
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jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction, since a nexus between the act and claim no longer
needs to be direct.102 Courts that use the substantial connection test disagree, reasoning
that the substantial connection test "retains the requirement that specific jurisdiction be
based upon a connection between the plaintiffs claim and the defendant's forum
contacts." 0 3
C. The "Proximate Cause" Test
Some courts wrestling with the "arising from or related to" conundrum employ
the "proximate cause" test, which would fall at the plausible/strict end of the Twombly
spectrum. The proximate cause test "examines whether any of the defendant's contacts
with the forum are relevant to the merits of the plaintiff's claim."' In other words, the
court determines whether the defendant's contacts are the "proximate cause" or "legal
cause" of the plaintiffs cause of action. 05 This prong is satisfied if the injury is a
foreseeable consequence of the defendant's contact with the forum.
Of the three tests, the proximate cause test is regarded as the "most restrictive,"' 06
and is therefore more likely to result in the denial of personal jurisdiction than the but
for or substantial connection tests. Indeed, proximate cause requires the defendant's
conduct to be both the cause-in-fact and the foreseeable cause of injury.107 The
proximate cause test may best reflect the efficiency and cost-conscious spirit of
102. See Lea Brilmayer, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1444, 1461
(1988) (arguing in context of malfunctioning product cases that predicating specific jurisdiction upon presence
of similar products in forum state risks turning specific jurisdiction into general jurisdiction).
103. Vons, 926 P.2d at 1097. The California Supreme Court in Vons discussed and rejected this
criticism. Id. (rejecting defendant's argument relying on reasoning similar to that presented in Lea Brilmayer,
How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REv. 77, 84).
According to Professor Brilmayer, the purpose of specific jurisdiction is to allow states to regulate conduct
within the state, but the substantial connection test does not necessarily limit specific jurisdiction to those kinds
of claims. See Brilmayer, supra note 102, at 1459-60. The California Supreme Court concluded, however, that
Professor Brilmayer's argument is based on a faulty assumption. Regulating in-state conduct is not the only
purpose of specific jurisdiction; rather, states also have an interest in "providing a judicial forum for its
residents-so long as the goal of fairness to defendants also is observed." Vons, 926 P.2d at 1110. The U.S.
Supreme Court has provided some guidance as to how much "relatedness" will support specific jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant. In Rush v. Savchuk, the plaintiff filed a complaint in Minnesota for personal
injuries arising from an Indiana automobile accident. 444 U.S. 320, 322 (1980). The plaintiff claimed
jurisdiction was proper in Minnesota because the defendant's insurance company did business there, and the
insurer's obligation to defend and indemnify its insured in the accident litigation was inevitably the focus that
would determine the victim's rights and obligations. Id. at 328. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the
insurance company's contacts could not be imputed to the defendant for the purpose of establishing personal
jurisdiction. Id at 328-29. Therefore, there were not "significant contacts between the litigation and the
forum" because "[t]he insurance policy [was] not the subject matter of the case . .. nor [was] it related to the
operative facts of the negligence action." Id. at 329.
104. O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 318-19 (3d Cir. 2007).
105. See, e.g., Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 142 F.3d 26, 35 (1st Cir. 1998)
(holding that defendant's contacts must be "legal cause" of plaintiffs injury, i.e., "the defendant's in-state
conduct [must] g[i]ve birth to the cause of action" (quoting United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. 163
Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1089 (1st Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
106. Sandy Lane, 496 F.3d at 318.
107. Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 477 (Tex. 1995).
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Twombly. 08 The First Circuit provides a good example of the proximate cause test
approach in Marino v. Hyatt Corp.109 In that case, a Massachusetts resident brought
suit in her home state against Hyatt, a Delaware corporation, for injuries sustained
when she slipped in the bathtub of her Hawaii hotel room.1 0 Applying a strict version
of the proximate cause requirement, the court concluded that Marino's claim did not
"aris[e] from" any business that Hyatt transacted in Massachusetts."' The court
reasoned that "[the] plaintiffs' advance reservation agreement with Hyatt would hardly
be an important, or perhaps even a material, element of proof in [the] slip and fall
case," and emphasized that to accept the plaintiffs' argument "would be to render the
'arising from' requirement ... a virtual nullity." 12
The First Circuit continued its adherence to the proximate cause test in a case that
illustrates its difference from the but for test. In Pizarro v. Hoteles Concorde Int'l,
C.A.,113 the plaintiff saw the defendant's advertisement in a Puerto Rican newspaper,
then traveled to the defendant's hotel in Aruba and was injured there.114 The plaintiff
then brought suit in a Puerto Rican court, alleging negligence."' 5 The Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit held that there was no personal jurisdiction over the defendant-
hotel because its newspaper advertisements were not relevant to the merits of the claim,
i.e., did not in and of themselves cause the plaintiff harm and thus bore no substantive
relationship to the claim.116 Acknowledging that but for the advertisements no claim
would have arisen, the court nevertheless found that the advertisements were not the
"legal or proximate cause of the . .. injury" and therefore the claim did not "arise from"
nor was it "related to" the defendant's contacts with the forum." 7
With its stricter requirement of a causal nexus between the defendant's contacts
with the forum and the defendant's allegedly improper conduct, the proximate cause
test most closely parallels the "plausible" standard enunciated in Twombly and best
serves the values promulgated in that case, including efficiency and cost-effectiveness.
A plaintiff who is required to bring suit in a forum where the defendant's contacts are
relevant to the merits of his claim is far less likely to need more information about the
defendant's contacts with the forum than if the threshold contacts requirement is
108. See infra Part IV for an analysis of how courts must weigh the tradeoffs between cost, efficiency,
and access to courts.
109. 793 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1986).
110. Marino, 793 F.2d at 427.
I11. Id. at 431 (alteration in original).
112. Id. at 430; see also Wims v. Beach Terrace Motor Inn, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 264, 268 (E.D. Pa. 1991)
(holding that causal link between brochures Inn sent to Pennsylvania and injury sustained at Inn in New Jersey
was "simply too attenuated to say that the injury arose from Beach Terrace's activities in the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania"); Simpson v. Quality Oil Co., 723 F. Supp. 382, 388 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (holding that
"substantive relevance" is proper test for exercise of specific jurisdiction); Dirks v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 642
F. Supp. 971, 975 (D. Kan. 1986) (finding connection between cruise ship operator's negligent preparation of
food on board ship in California and its acts of soliciting passengers and sending tickets to Kansas too tenuous
to support jurisdiction).
113. 907 F.2d 1256 (1st Cir. 1990).
114. Pizzaro, 907 F.2d at 1257-58.
115. Id. at 1258.
116. Id. at 1259.
117. Id. at 1260.
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lower." 8 If courts heed Twombly's call for more factual specificity in pleadings and
apply the proximate cause test to averments of personal jurisdiction, less personal
jurisdiction discovery will be needed. And if courts apply the colorable claim test to
motions for personal jurisdiction discovery, Twombly's requirement that courts factor
in the costs of discovery will be met.119
Plaintiffs confronted with a challenge to their claims of jurisdiction often do not
face the same draconian outcome as plaintiffs who cannot properly support their
pleadings: in the latter circumstance the court dismisses the case outright. However, in
the former situation the case often can be salvaged with transfer to another jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406 or the refiling of the case in a jurisdiction where personal
jurisdiction is clearly proper. Indeed, even these personal jurisdiction allegations can be
salvaged using the "fairness factors" articulated by the Supreme Court in Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz.120 Thus, defendants should not be forced to incur needless costs
regarding personal jurisdiction discovery, and Twombly presents a paradigm to avoid
such imposition.
IV. BELL ATLANTIc CoRP. v. TWOMBLY
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twomblyl21 taps into central themes in the world of civil
procedure-namely issues of cost, efficiency, and access to courts-and the tradeoffs
necessarily made when courts take those matters into account. In this Part, I provide a
brief review of the Twombly decision to set the analysis, recommendations, and
conclusions of this Article in context. Although Twombly directly addresses substantive
pleading issues, its central premise is directly relevant to solving important personal
jurisdiction questions.
In 1984 the American Telephone & Telegraph Company ("AT&T"),122 which
until then had a nationwide monopoly on telephone service,123 was forced to divest its
local telephone service business.124 A system of regional telephone monopolies was
thereupon created, popularly known as the "Baby Bells," but also called "Incumbent
118. See, e.g., Savage v. Bioport, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 55, 62-63 (D.D.C. 2006) (stating that, if plaintiff
is claiming jurisdiction based on specific jurisdiction, court is more likely to deny plaintiffs request for
discovery relating to contacts that do not arise out ofplaintiff's claim).
119. See infra notes 171-78 and accompanying text for an analysis of the colorable claim test and how
courts weigh the costs of discovery.
120. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
121. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
122. For a general history of AT&T and the events leading to its divestiture, see generally JAMES R.
MESSENGER, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH COMPANY: How "MA BELL" DIED
GIVING BIRTH TO THE INFORMATION AGE (2007). For an early history of AT&T, see ALBERT BIGELOW PAINE,
IN ONE MAN'S LIFE: BEING CHAPTERS FROM THE PERSONAL & BUSINESS CAREER OF THEODORE N. VAIL 98-
145 (Hayne Press 2007) (1921).
123. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567-68 ("In the decade preceding the 1996 [Telecommunications] Act
and well before that, monopoly was the norm in telecommunications, not the exception.").
124. Id. at 549; see also United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 147-234 (D.D.C. 1982)
(affirming that antitrust consent decree ordering AT&T to divest of local operating companies was in "public
interest" and describing divestiture plan), af'd mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001
(1983).
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Local Exchange Carriers" ("ILECs").125 In 1996, however, with the enactment of the
Telecommunications Act, Congress withdrew its approval of the ILECs' regional
monopolies and imposed on the ILECs "a host of duties intended to facilitate market
entry" by competitors.1 26 Among those duties was an obligation that each ILEC "share
its network with competitors."l 27 Those competitors came to be known as "competitive
local exchange carriers" ("CLECs").128
The plaintiff s bar commenced the Twombly lawsuit on behalf of a purported class
of all "subscribers of local telephone and/or high speed internet services" during certain
specified dates,129 seeking "treble damages and declaratory and injunctive relief for
claimed violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act."130 The complaint alleged that the ILECs
conspired to restrict trade in two ways, each a violation of section 1: (1) by engaging in
"'parallel conduct' in their respective service areas to inhibit the growth of upstart
CLECs," and (2) by agreeing amongst themselves "to refrain from competing against
one another." 31
The Court first noted that "Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only
'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,'
in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the .. .claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests."'" 32 The Court then discussed the application of Rule 8(a)(2) to a motion
to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6):
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not
need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the
"grounds" of his "entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the
complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).133
The Court then applied those standards to the Sherman Act claim and held that "stating
such a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest
that a[] [collusive] agreement was made."134 In the context of an antitrust action, this
means that the allegations set forth in the complaint must "raise[] a suggestion of a
preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be independent
125. The regional companies were also sometimes referred to as "Regional Bell Operating Companies."
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 549.
126. Id. (quoting AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371 (1999)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-252 (2006) (stating statutory duties of telecommunications carriers).
127. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 549 (quoting Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 402 (2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
128. Id.
129. Id at 550 (quoting Amended Complaint at para. 53, app. 28, 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(No. 02 Civ. 10220 (GEL))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 550-51.
132. Id. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
133. Id. (alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
134. Id. at 556.
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action." "I Because parallel conduct is not prohibited by section 1 of the Sherman Act,
without allegations of an illicit agreement, "[a]n allegation of parallel conduct is ...
much like a naked assertion of conspiracy in a § 1 complaint: it gets the complaint
close to stating a claim, but without some further factual enhancement it stops short of
the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitle[ment] to relief." 36 Further,
according to the Twombly Court, "[a]sking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement
does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for
enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of
illegal agreement." 37
The Twombly opinion advocates that trial courts put an end to marginal litigation
"at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the
court."'3 8 Throughout its opinion in Twombly, the Court was visibly concerned with
efficiency and economy-or, it may more accurately be stated-with the inefficiency
and expense that characterizes much modem litigation.139 The Court reinforced the
"practical significance of the Rule 8 entitlement requirement." 40
We explained that something beyond the mere possibility of loss causation
must be alleged, lest a plaintiff with "a largely groundless claim" be allowed
to "take up the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so
representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement value."'41
The Court then referred to earlier commentators who had emphasized the need to rein
in costly litigation,142 and affirmed the district court's power to hold the plaintiff
accountable for providing sufficient evidence of a claim before embarking upon
expensive discovery.
Thus, it is one thing to be cautious before dismissing an antitrust complaint
in advance of discovery, but quite another to forget that proceeding to
antitrust discovery can be expensive .... [A] district court must retain the
power to insist upon some specificity in pleading before allowing a
potentially massive factual controversy to proceed." 43
The majority worried that, if the problem of discovery abuse was resolved not at the
pleading stage, but later, at the summary judgment stage, "the threat of discovery
135. Id. at 557.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 556.
138. Id at 558 (quoting 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1216, at 233-34 (3d ed. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
139. Id. at 558-60.
140. Id. at 557.
141. Id. at 557-58 (quoting Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)).
142. Id. at 558; see also Martha Neil, OK, Discovery's a Problem, But What Can Be Done About It?,
ABA JOURNAL: LAW NEWS Now, Sept. I1, 2008, http://www.abajournal.com/news/ok-discoverys_a
problembutwhatcanbedone about it/ (reporting that survey of trial lawyers found that discovery costs
prevent some cases from being brought to trial).
143. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (citation omitted) (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Cal.
State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528 n.17 (1983)).
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expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before
reaching those proceedings."'"
Concluding this line of thought, the majority reasoned that "it is only by taking
care to require allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope
to avoid the potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with no 'reasonably
founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence."'l4 5
While commentators continue to engage in a vigorous debate over whether
Twombly should be applicable to pleadings in cases other than antitrust matters, several
circuits have already made their determinations:146
* In the First Circuit, the court of appeals held that Twombly gives Rule 12(b)(6)
"more heft."l 47
* In the Second Circuit, the court of appeals rejected a narrow view of Twombly,
holding that the Supreme Court's reasoning suggested "that it intended to make
some alteration in the regime of pure notice pleading" and has since applied
Twombly in various contexts.148
144. Id at 559; see also Stancil, supra note 29, at 94-95 (recommending bifurcation of pleading
standards along cost disparity lines to avoid plaintiffs' filing of "objectively frivolous lawsuits when they can
impose higher net pretrial costs upon defendants than defendants can impose upon plaintiffs"). The Senate also
has recognized this possibility, albeit in the context of their deliberations preceding the enactment of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006). See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 8 (1995)
(finding that coercive or in terrorem settlements are driven by time that employees must spend responding to
discovery requests and providing testimony), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 687; H.R. REP. No. 104-
369, at 37 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (quoting general counsel of investment bank as stating that in securities fraud
cases, discovery costs are "'roughly 80% of total litigation costs"' (citing Hearings Before the Securities
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 104th Cong., I st Sess. (Mar. 2, 1995)
(testimony of former SEC Commissioner J. Carter Beese, Jr., Chairman of the Capital Markets Regulatory
Reform Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies))), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 736.
145. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (alteration in original) (quoting Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 347).
146. See Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of by, and for the People: Notes for
the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REv. 1, 107-08 (2008) (noting Twombly relates to antitrust
regulation, but federal courts have applied new standard in other types of cases). Moreover, one could argue
that the Supreme Court itself has extended the reach of Twombly. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights,
Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314-15 (2007) (requiring that allegations of scienter in a securities fraud action under
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006), be not just plausible, but in fact be
"cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent"). Not all circuits take
such an expansive view of Twombly, however. In Aktieselskabet AF 21. Nov. 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., the
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit concluded that Twombly "leaves the long-standing fundamentals of
notice pleading intact." 525 F.3d 8, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2008). That circuit was emphatic that in Twombly the
Supreme Court "indicated quite clearly" that it did not intend to create a heightened pleading standard for all
cases arising under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 16 (arguing Twombly reiterated that heightened
pleading standard would have to arise from amendment of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). The Ninth
Circuit shares the D.C. Circuit's limited view of Twombly. See Skaff v. Meridien N. Am. Beverly Hills, LLC,
506 F.3d 832, 841-42 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Twombly as instructing courts "not to impose such heightened
[pleading] standards").
147. ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Advest, Inc., 512 F.3d 46, 58 (1st Cir. 2008).
148. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); see also Benzman v. Whitman, 523 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 2008) (stating that
under Twombly, an implausible claim must be supported by supplemental facts in order to survive motion to
dismiss); Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 213 (2d Cir. 2008) (applying Twombly to case alleging
discrimination in violation of Fair Housing Act); ATSI Commc'ns., Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98
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* In the Third Circuit, in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court of appeals held
that Twombly's 'plausibility' paradigm for evaluating the sufficiency of
complaints" is not restricted to the antitrust context. 149 The court noted that "[t]he
plausibility paradigm announced in Twombly applies with equal force to analyzing
the adequacy of claims of employment discrimination." 50
* In the Fourth Circuit, the court of appeals applied Twombly's "plausibility
standard" to a case brought under the Virginia Freedom of Information Act.' 5'
* In the Sixth Circuit, the court of appeals "cited the heightened pleading standard of
Twombly in a wide variety of cases," thereby expanding its applicability beyond
antitrust actions. 152
* In the Eighth Circuit, the court of appeals held, in a non-antitrust case, that a
plaintiff must allege facts "that affirmatively and plausibly suggest" he has the
claimed right, not just "facts that are merely consistent with such a right."' 53
* In the Tenth Circuit, the court of appeals has given the Twombly standard greater
"bite" in cases involving government defendants, including civil rights claims
brought under section 1983, "reflecting the special interest in resolving the
affirmative defense of qualified immunity at the earliest [possible] stage of a
litigation." 54
* In the Eleventh Circuit, the court of appeals cited Twombly in reversing the
dismissal of a claim brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act.' 5
Furthermore, courts share an abiding concern about the escalating and potentially
devastating costs of discovery, particularly when the claim appears less than
meritorious,' 56 thus mirroring Twombly's heightened concern with the expense and
n.2 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating belief that Twombly applies beyond only antitrust cases (citing Iqbal, 490 F.3d at
158)); Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 155-58 (stating Twombly does not apply only to antitrust cases, and Twombly does
not require heightened fact pleading, only flexible plausibility standard requiring pleader to amplify claim with
factual allegations when necessary to render claim plausible).
149. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008).
150. Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 322 (3d Cir. 2008).
151. Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that allegation of lack of rational
relationship between statutory prisoner exclusion and state interest does not meet plausibility standard due to
presumption of legislative rationality and "readily apparent justification" for legislation).
152. Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 n.2
(6th Cir. 2008) (compiling list of these cases and their contexts).
153. Stalley ex rel. U.S. v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 509 F.3d 517, 521 (8th Cir. 2007).
154. VanZandt v. Okla. Dep't of Human Servs., 276 F. App'x 843, 847 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1249 (10th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Patton v. West, 276 F. App'x 756, 758 (10th Cir. 2008) (discussing action brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
1985, and 1986).
155. Sec'y of Labor v. Labbe, 319 F. App'x 761, 763 (1Ith Cir. 2008); see also Watts v. Fla. Int'l Univ.,
495 F.3d 1289, 1295-96 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that courts may not assess probability of facts, but plaintiff
must "allege[] enough facts to suggest, raise a reasonable expectation of, and render plausible" his claim).
156. See, e.g., Pennsylvania ex rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 182 (3d Cir. 1988)
(discussing long-held belief by courts that modem litigation is too expensive to waste time and money on
"fanciful claims"); Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int'l, Inc., No. 4:07-CV-02-RLV, 2007 WL 4373980, at *2 (N.D.
Ga. Dec. I1, 2007) (recognizing that while courts should be cautious in granting motions to dismiss prior to
discovery, courts must remember that antitrust discovery can be expensive); Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech
Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (holding threshold of plausibility must be met before
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burden of discovery. Indeed, as one commentator noted, the "central problem
confronted by Twombly is discovery run amok."' 57 The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit stated that Twombly "teaches that a defendant should not be forced to
undergo costly discovery unless the complaint contains enough detail, factual or
argumentative, to indicate that the plaintiff has a substantial case." 58
All courts therefore should heed Twombly's mandate that they "avoid the
potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with no reasonably founded hope
that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence."l 5 9 Twombly represents an
effort by the Court to rein in some of the excess and extravagance of modem
litigation.160 This mandate should apply to claims of personal jurisdiction, as well as
those regarding the merits of an action. Twombly offers an opportunity to resolve a
clash among the courts as to what standard to apply when considering a plaintiffs
claim that the court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant, and under what
circumstances a court should allow discovery into personal jurisdiction issues. By
focusing on cost and efficiency in matters regarding personal jurisdiction, courts will
heed Twombly's clear warnings regarding judicial waste and abuse.
V. THE DILEMMA: How MUCH Is Too MUCH?
Courts seeking to resolve the "arising from or related to" conundrum often have to
do more than apply one of the three tests discussed in Part III above. As already noted,
a plaintiff might also call upon the court to allow some discovery into the defendant's
contacts with the forum state. In that event, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twomblyl61 again
antitrust case may proceed to discovery); Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire:
What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 1217,
1238 (2008) (reasoning Court decided Twombly as means to prevent costs of discovery from incentivizing
defendants to settle without regard to merits of case).
157. Picker, supra note 12, at 202-03 (stating that Twombly suggests Court believes refining discovery
rules will not control discovery costs, and heightened standards outweigh plaintiffs' inability to get at antitrust
conspiracies); see also Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 (2d Cir. 2007) (reasoning that discovery concerns
evident in Twombly suggest that adjusted pleading standards only apply to cases where massive discovery may
create unacceptable settlement pressures), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937
(2009).
158. Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 802-03 (7th Cir. 2008).
159. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
160. In this respect, Twombly may also reflect the character and personal proclivities of its author,
Justice David Souter, whose frugality has long been noted. See, e.g., Jerome Cramer, Mr. Souter Comes to
Town, TIME, Oct. 15, 1990, at 67 (describing Souter's "image as a shy, decent man who likes old cars, black-
and-white television sets and the Boston Red Sox" and who lives in a "modest one bedroom apartment");
Jennifer O'Shea, 10 Things You Didn't Know About David Souter, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 1, 2007,
http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/national/2007/10/01/10-things-you-didnt-know-about-david-souter.html
(noting that Souter "often brings his own lunch to the office and, at the time of his confirmation, claimed not to
own a color television"). Interestingly, this is not the first time that the normally old-fashioned Justice Souter
has taken the lead in a case that deals with modem technology. See JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE
SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 245-46 (2007) (discussing Justice Souter's handling of Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005), and noting that this "man who worked
exclusively with a fountain pen" crafted opinion that "showed a sophisticated understanding of the markets for
both technology and entertainment").
161. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
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provides guidance as to when and how much personal jurisdiction discovery courts
should permit.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) allows a defendant to move to dismiss a
claim based on lack of personal jurisdiction. 162 In response to such a motion, the
burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that jurisdiction is proper.163 Further, "in the
face of a properly supported motion for dismissal, the plaintiff may not stand on his
pleadings but must, by affidavit or otherwise, set forth specific facts showing that the
court has [personal] jurisdiction."' 6 4
Presented with a properly supported 12(b)(2) motion and opposition, the
court has three procedural alternatives: it may decide the motion upon ...
affidavits [and other supporting documents] alone [without permitting
discovery]; it may permit discovery in aid of deciding the motion; or it may
conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve any apparent factual questions. 165
The court has the discretion to select the procedural method to utilize.' 66 The court's
choice determines the weight of the plaintiff s burden. 167
When the court decides the motion without discovery, "on the basis only of
motion papers, supporting legal memoranda and the relevant allegations of a complaint,
the burden on the plaintiff is simply to make a prima facie showing of a sufficient
jurisdictional basis in order to survive the jurisdictional challenge."1 68 Making a prima
facie showing of personal jurisdiction means that the plaintiff must present "evidence
that, if credited, is enough to support findings of all facts essential to personal
jurisdiction." 69 Moreover, generally plaintiffs may not rely on unsupported allegations
in their complaints to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction.Io
162. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).
163. See Second Amendment Found. v. U.S. Conference of Mayors, 274 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(stating that plaintiffs did not produce enough evidence to meet burden); Dean v. Motel 6 Operating L.P., 134
F.3d 1269, 1272 (6th Cir. 1998) (discussing plaintiff's burden with or without evidentiary hearing);
CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1261-62 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that plaintiff bears burden).
164. Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1458 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting Weller v. Cromwell Oil Co.,
504 F.2d 927, 930 (6th Cir. 1974)).
165. Id. (citing Serras v. First Tenn. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 875 F.2d 1212, 1214 (6th Cir. 1989)).
166. Id.
167. Dean, 134 F.3d at 1272; Theunissen, 935 F.2d at 1458; Serras, 875 F.2d at 1214.
168. Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 676 (4th Cir.1989). Moreover, "[iln considering a challenge on
such a record, the court must construe all relevant pleading allegations in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, assume credibility, and draw the most favorable inferences for the existence of jurisdiction." Id. at
676. To establish a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show: (1) that a statute or rule
authorizes service of process on the nonresident defendant, and (2) that service on the nonresident defendant
comports with the requirements of the Due Process Clause. In re Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d 619, 627 (4th Cir.
1997).
169. Boit v. Gar-Tec Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 675 (1st Cir. 1992); see also Carefirst of Md., Inc. v.
Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 396 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating that when court's power to exercise
personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant is challenged by Rule 12(b)(2) motion, judge resolves
questions of jurisdiction, with plaintiff carrying burden to prove grounds for jurisdiction by preponderance of
evidence).
170. See, e.g., Boit, 967 F.2d at 675 (noting rule that plaintiffs may not rely on unsupported assertions in
pleadings to establish prima facie existence of personal jurisdiction).
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Often, however, a plaintiff will seek to obtain discovery in order to make the
factual presentation necessary to survive a 12(b)(2) motion. Some courts employ a
requirement that the plaintiff provide a "colorable" claim of personal jurisdiction
before they will permit discovery.' 7' The colorable claim requirement anticipates the
heightened standards announced in Twombly, in that the colorable claim requirement
dictates that the plaintiff must demonstrate that it "can supplement its [personal]
jurisdictional allegations through discovery," 72 or that it has "at least a good faith
belief that such discovery will enable it to show that the court has personal jurisdiction
over the defendant." 73 Further mirroring Twombly's distaste for attenuated claims,
courts are likely to deny discovery if the plaintiffs jurisdictional allegations are
"speculative" or "conclusory" or if the plaintiffs case for jurisdiction is
"implausible."l 74
In Twombly, the Supreme Court required a plaintiff bringing an antitrust claim to
provide "enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was
made."' 75 Similarly, the focus under the colorable claim standard is both on the degree
of factual specificity of the plaintiffs threshold case for personal jurisdiction and the
likelihood that discovery will uncover facts relevant to the jurisdictional question.
Additionally, courts are especially wary of permitting discovery when the plaintiff
seeks discovery of private information, particularly if the plaintiff has not presented a
"colorable basis" for personal jurisdiction, thereby "render[ing] the request
burdensome." 76 Nevertheless, there is a significant degree of flexibility in the
colorable claim standard, and a plaintiff may have to make a lesser or greater threshold
showing in different types of cases, depending on the basis upon which the plaintiff
claims personal jurisdiction exists." Some courts have elected not to use the colorable
claim standard at all.'78
171. See, e.g., United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 625 (1st Cir. 2001) (noting that
plaintiff who makes out case against out-of-state corporation for existence of personal jurisdiction may be
entitled to degree of jurisdictional discovery if corporation asserts jurisdictional defense); Sunview Condo.
Ass'n v. Flexel Int'l, Ltd., 116 F.3d 962, 964 (1st Cir. 1997) (same); Savage v. Bioport, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d
55, 62 (D.D.C. 2006) (stating that courts act reasonably in requiring plaintiff to show colorable basis for
jurisdiction before subjecting defendant to "intrusive and burdensome discovery" (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Bancoult v. McNamara, 214 F.R.D. 5, 10 (D.D.C. 2003) (stating that denial of
discovery is not abuse of discretion where plaintiff fails to assert colorable claim of jurisdiction). "In addition
to making a colorable claim, it is also incumbent upon the plaintiff to 'present facts to the court which show
why jurisdiction would be found if discovery were permitted."' Negr6n-Torres v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc.,
478 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Swiss Am. Bank, 274 F.3d at 626).
172. Bancoult, 214 F.R.D. at 10 (quoting GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d
1343, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
173. Savage, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 62 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
174. See, e.g., Boit, 967 F.2d at 675 (stating long-established rule that plaintiffs cannot rely on
unsupported pleading allegations to make prima facie case for personal jurisdiction).
175. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
176. Ellis v. Fortune Seas, Ltd., 175 F.R.D. 308, 313 (S.D. Ind. 1997); see also Commercial Union Ins.
Co. v. Westrope, 730 F.2d 729, 732 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding that court can deny motion to compel discovery
after concluding that questions are irrelevant).
177. For example, if the plaintiff claims that the court has jurisdiction based on general jurisdiction, the
court is likely to require a greater threshold showing from the plaintiff than if he had claimed that the court had
jurisdiction based on specific jurisdiction. See Terracom v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 562 (9th Cir.
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Furthermore, courts have often indicated that personal jurisdiction discovery
should be allowed in response to a Rule 12(b)(2) motion when the facts that are needed
to establish personal jurisdiction are in the exclusive control of the defendant and the
plaintiff may not otherwise be able to establish personal jurisdiction. 9 According to
the Supreme Court, when a defendant "put[s the jurisdictional] issue in question, [it
does] not have the option of blocking the reasonable attempt of [the plaintiff] to meet
its burden of proof [through discovery]." 80
Additionally, courts are more likely to allow discovery when a plaintiff claims
that personal jurisdiction exists based on a fact-specific multifactor test such as a
stream-of-commerce theory or when jurisdiction is based on a foreign corporation's
relationship to an in-forum subsidiary.181
1995) (finding that district court did not abuse discretion in refusing discovery request where plaintiff offered
only bare allegations of personal jurisdiction in face of specific factual denials made by defendant). If the
plaintiff is claiming jurisdiction based on specific jurisdiction, the court is more likely to deny the plaintiff's
request for discovery relating to contacts that do not arise out of the plaintiffs claim. E.g., Savage, 460 F.
Supp. 2d at 62-63.
178. In contrast to the "colorable claim" requirement, the Third Circuit has adopted a more liberal
standard, which requires only that the plaintiffs claim of personal jurisdiction not be "frivolous." Compagnie
des Bauxites de Guinee v. L'Union Atlantique S.A. d'Assurances, 723 F.2d 357, 362 (3d Cir. 1983) (finding
that district court should allow discovery where claim is not "clearly frivolous"); see also Toys "R" Us, Inc. v.
Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 458 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding that courts should assist plaintiffs by permitting
jurisdictional discovery if claim isn't clearly frivolous); Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n,
107 F.3d 1026, 1042 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that jurisdictional discovery is allowed unless claim is "clearly
frivolous" (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Nehemiah v. Athletics Cong. of U.S.A., 765
F.2d 42, 48 (3d Cir. 1985) (reiterating not "clearly frivolous" standard expressed in Compagnie des Bauxites
de Guinee). This standard requires only that the plaintiff provide "some competent evidence to demonstrate
that personal jurisdiction over the defendant might exist before allowing discovery to proceed" and the "court
must be satisfied that there is some indication that this particular defendant is amenable to suit in this forum."
Hansen v. Neumueller GmbH, 163 F.R.D. 471, 475 (D. Del. 1995). Put otherwise, if a plaintiff presents factual
allegations that suggest "with reasonable particularity" the possible existence of the requisite "contacts
between the defendant and the forum state," the plaintiff's right to conduct jurisdictional discovery should be
sustained. Mellon Bank (E.) PSFS v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Under the standard used by courts in the Third Circuit, however, it is inappropriate
for the court to allow discovery if the plaintiff presents no jurisdictional facts or relies on the "bare allegations"
in his complaint. See Hansen, 163 F.R.D. at 475-76 (articulating standard and finding that plaintiff may not
simply rely on complaint as grounds for additional discovery); Sandvik AB v. Advent Int'l Corp., 83 F. Supp.
2d 442, 447 (D. Del. 1999) (stating that although courts typically allow discovery to establish jurisdiction
when complaint alone is inadequate for this purpose, courts need not allow discovery if suit is frivolous), affd,
220 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2000); Joint Stock Soc'y v. Heublein, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 177, 192 (D. Del. 1996) (noting
that plaintiff cannot rely on allegations in complaint after discovery has begun); Garshman v. Universal Res.
Holding, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 1359, 1366 (D.N.J.1986) (holding that mere unsupported allegation that defendant
"transacts business" in area is "clearly frivolous"), aff'd, 824 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, in the
Third Circuit, a "low threshold for permitting [personal jurisdiction] discovery" prevails. Greene v. New Dana
Perfumes Corp. (In re Renaissance Cosmetics, Inc.), No. 99-783, 2000 WL 33712289, at *3 (Bankr. D. Del.
Dec. 14, 2000).
179. Hansen, 163 F.R.D. at 475.
180. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 709 (1982).
181. See, e.g., In re Magnetic Audiotape Antitrust Litig., 334 F.3d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that
discovery should have been permitted to develop facts related to degree of control of foreign corporation over
its in-forum subsidiary); Renner v. Lanard Toys Ltd., 33 F.3d 277, 283-84 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that
discovery should have been permitted to develop facts necessary to determine whether there was jurisdiction
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Courts also consider the relationship between the parties in deciding what
threshold showing of personal jurisdiction the plaintiff must make before it will permit
discovery into the issue. A court is likely to be more lenient if the plaintiff is a
"stranger" to a corporate defendant. In the oft-cited words of the First Circuit:
A plaintiff who is a total stranger to a corporation should not be required,
unless he has been undiligent, to try [personal jurisdiction] on affidavits
without the benefit of full discovery. . . . The condemnation of plaintiffs
proposed further activities as a "fishing expedition" was unwarranted. When
the fish is identified, and the question is whether it is in the pond, we know
no reason to deny a plaintiff the customary license.182
On the other hand, a court is likely to require a stronger factual showing before
allowing personal jurisdiction discovery if there is a contractual relationship between
the plaintiff and the defendant because "the court can reasonably expect the plaintiff to
be able to specify at the outset at least those contacts the defendant has had with the
forum that would support specific (as opposed to general) personal jurisdiction."'83
In some situations, courts have raised policy reasons why jurisdictional discovery
should be denied when a plaintiff has not made a certain threshold showing of personal
jurisdiction. For example, courts have indicated that foreign defendants in particular
should be protected from discovery when the plaintiff has made an inadequate
threshold showing that the court has personal jurisdiction.184 This reflects a broader
wariness about requiring defendants to submit to extensive discovery when personal
jurisdiction is especially questionable.185
Recently, however, courts have begun to focus on the costs of personal
jurisdiction discovery. For example, in Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia
International Shipping Corp.,186 the Supreme Court held that when the district court is
presented with a "textbook" case for dismissal based on forum non conveniens, it is not
required to first determine whether it has personal jurisdiction especially where
"personal jurisdiction is difficult to determine" and "[d]iscovery concerning personal
jurisdiction would have burdened [the defendant] with expense and delay." 87
under post-Asahi stream-of-commerce theory); Crane v. Carr, 814 F.2d 758, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that
discovery should have been permitted to determine if multifactor long-arm statute for personal jurisdiction in
District of Columbia had been satisfied); Hansen, 163 F.R.D. at 475 (allowing plaintiff to go forward with
limited discovery to establish personal jurisdiction over foreign corporation alleged to have manufactured and
installed equipment in forum state that injured plaintiff). Further, jurisdictional discovery is more likely to be
granted where the defendant is a corporate entity, rather than an individual. See Mass. Sch. ofLaw, 107 F.3d at
1042 (noting that jurisdictional discovery relates to corporate defendants and whether they "do[] business" in
state, and where defendant is individual, presumption of discovery diminishes).
182. Surpitski v. Hughes-Keenan Corp., 362 F.2d 254, 255-56 (1st Cir. 1966).
183. Ellis v. Fortune Seas, Ltd., 175 F.R.D. 308, 313 n.3 (S.D. Ind. 1997).
184. See, e.g., Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Reimer Express World Corp., 230 F.3d
934, 947 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that foreign defendants should not usually be subjected to extensive and
burdensome discovery for purposes of determining personal jurisdiction); Jazini v. Nissan Motor Co., 148 F.3d
181, 186 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that it would be inappropriate for court to deviate from established discovery
rules for foreign defendants simply because plaintiffs have problems meeting standards).
185. Ellis, 175 F.R.D. at 312.
186. 549 U.S. 422 (2007).
187. Sinochem Int'l, 549 U.S. at 435.
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Acknowledging Sinochem, the district court in Guam decided to transfer a case in
which the defendant disputed personal jurisdiction.188 The court indicated that the cost
of personal jurisdiction discovery was one of the reasons that transfer was proper since
there was clearly personal jurisdiction in the Northern District of California.189
The District of Connecticut denied personal jurisdiction discovery in a case where
the plaintiff was "already aware of the facts giving rise to the action" and discovery
would have been "expensive and burdensome for the non-resident defendants." 90
Similarly, the Southern District of New York denied personal jurisdiction discovery,
stating that the "plaintiff cannot put defendant through the costly process of discovery,
even discovery limited to jurisdictional matters, simply because it thinks that it can
probably show significant contact with the state of New York if discovery were to
proceed."191
Thus, although the case law may be limited, it appears that some courts are, at
least inadvertently, adhering to Twombly's admonition that discovery costs must be
factored into a court's decisions, including those involving personal jurisdiction
determinations. The colorable claim requirement, if properly applied, is a step toward
meeting that directive.
VI. THE ROLE OF A MAGISTRATE OR SPECIALIZED JUDGE
I suggest that a specialized judge or magistrate be responsible in the first instance
for evaluating a plaintiffs claim of personal jurisdiction over a defendant.192
Designating a judicial officer who can focus her attention on the often intricate and
intimate investigative work necessary to properly review a defendant's contacts with a
forum will help standardize and streamline the process of evaluating the existence of
personal jurisdiction. Indeed, a specialized magistrate or judge experienced with
requests for personal jurisdiction discovery would be ideally suited to opine whether
such discovery should even proceed-or whether such an undertaking would be costly
and inefficient. In this way, a degree of uniformity can be attained in what heretofore
has been an ad hoc process.
188. Nanya Tech. Corp. v. Fujitsu Ltd., No. 06-00025, 2007 WL 1845556, at *1 (D. Guam June 27,
2007).
189. Id. at *5 (stating that issue of personal jurisdiction has resulted in hundreds of thousands of pages of
discovery into connection between defendants and their contacts with foreign nation, as well as hundreds of
unanswered filings due to jurisdictional issue).
190. Anderson v. Bedford Assocs., Inc., No. 3:97 CV 1018, 1997 WL 631117, at *1, *5 (D. Conn. Sept.
19, 1997).
191. Bellepointe, Inc. v. Kohl's Dep't Stores, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 562, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
192. For a similar discussion of the proposed role of a magistrate in evaluating plaintiffs' requests to
litigate pseudonymously, and in overseeing the compilation and review of documentation necessary to
determine the assets of an alleged debtor held in civil contempt, see, respectively, Jayne S. Ressler, Privacy,
Plaintiffs, and Pseudonyms: The Anonymous Doe Plaintiffin the Information Age, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 195,
237-40 (2004), and Jayne S. Ressler, Civil Contempt Confinement and the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005: An Examination of Debtor Incarceration in the Modern Age, 37 RUTGERS
L.J. 355, 394-97 (2006).
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Reviewing a plaintiffs request for personal jurisdiction discovery is an ideal use
of a federal magistrate's authority under 28 U.S.C. § 636,193 and would be appropriate
for state magistrates or specialized judges as well. 194 The primary function of a
magistrate judge is to improve the efficiency of the judicial system and to handle
pretrial and preliminary matters. 195 The determination of a defendant's contacts with
the forum, or the evaluation of the costs of discovery regarding such alleged contacts,
thus fits squarely within the duties of the magistrate judge. 96 In this role, the
specialized judge or magistrate would have numerous functions. Primarily, she would
make a thorough evaluation of a defendant's contacts with the forum. After doing so,
the specialized judge or magistrate would present these contacts to the court, which
would then apply the appropriate test (preferably, the proximate cause test) and
determine whether or not those contacts sufficed for personal jurisdiction.
Over time specialized judges or magistrates would develop an expertise and
efficiency in dealing with evaluating defendants' contacts with the forum, and they
could continue their involvement with the case should problems develop throughout the
course of the litigation. This would increase judicial efficiency by freeing the courts
from the often time-consuming efforts necessary to evaluate defendants' contacts with
the forum. Additionally, specialized judges or magistrates would be in the best position
to determine the costs inherent in personal jurisdiction discovery. They could then
recommend that the court either permit or decline to allow such discovery. Having a
specialized judge or magistrate handle these matters in the first instance will reduce the
number and types of problems inherent in the current system. It is important, however,
for magistrates handling these personal jurisdiction claims to author written opinions
regarding their findings. This is particularly true because of the fact-intensive nature of
193. 28 U.S.C. § 636 states in relevant part: "Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary ... a
judge may designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the
court. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (2006).
194. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 22 ("The Legislature may provide for the appointment by
trial courts of record of officers such as commissioners to perform subordinate judicial duties."
(emphasis added)).
195. S. REP. No. 96-74, at 3 (1979) (expressing purpose of Federal Magistrates Act as facilitating
rational division of labor among district court judicial officers, since magistrate relieves judges from
personally hearing each pretrial motion or proceeding in preparation of case for trial), reprinted in 1979
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1469, 1471-72; S. REP. No. 92-1065, at 3 (1972) (noting that magistrates provide valuable
assistance to district court judges, thereby allowing those judges to spend more time on actual trial of cases),
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3350, 3351. The Supreme Court has also affirmed the intentions of Congress
in establishing the position of the federal magistrate. See, e.g., Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 934
(1991) (holding that Federal Magistrates Act was designed to relieve district courts of "subordinate duties that
often distract the courts from more important matters"); McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 142 (1991)
(finding that policy behind Act authorizes greater use of magistrates to assist federal judges); Mathews v.
Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 268 (1976) (finding that Congress intended magistrates to assist with vast amount of
additional work created for district courts); Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 463 (1974) (noting that Act
authorizes magistrates to perform duties formerly allocated to U.S. commissioners).
196. See, e.g., Cimon v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 03-255-P-H, 2004 WL 444026 (D. Me. Mar.
11, 2004) (denying, in decision by magistrate, plaintiffs motion for jurisdictional discovery and
recommending denial of plaintiffs motion to transfer), affd in part, vacated in part sub nom. Cimon v.
Gaffney, 401 F.3d I (1st Cir. 2005).
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the relevant inquiries. The precedential value of these decisions depends in large part
on the factual detail contained therein.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is beyond cavil that as our society, our economy, and our laws all become more
complex, litigation becomes more complicated as well. Increasing complexity leads to
increasing costs. Modem realities-including, not least of all, the enormous cost of
now-ubiquitous electronic discovery-demand that the courts' screening mechanisms
be tightened up, if they are to avoid being crushed under the weight of frivolous or
otherwise inappropriate lawsuits. Although personal jurisdiction questions may not
typically generate the astronomical costs of discovery that can arise in antitrust
litigation, they nonetheless contribute to a litigation system that, by necessity, has been
forced to focus on setting litigation thresholds. The but for test of personal jurisdiction
swings the courthouse door open far too wide, particularly when so many transactions
would not have occurred, and so many wrongs would not have befallen plaintiffs, "but
for" the defendant's Internet participation. The substantial connection test does a better
job of reigning in potentially frivolous and costly claims of personal jurisdiction, but it
does not go far enough in mandating that a plaintiffs personal jurisdiction claim move
from "conceivable" to "plausible." In contrast, the proximate cause test does not close
the courthouse door, but it does require plaintiffs to show that the defendant's contacts
with the forum are relevant to the merits of the claim. Because of its stricter
requirement of a causal nexus between the defendant's contacts with the forum and the
defendant's allegedly improper conduct, the proximate cause test most closely parallels
the "plausible" standard enunciated in Twombly and best promotes efficiency and cost-
effectiveness. This stricter reading of personal jurisdiction requirements is in keeping
with Twombly, and courts should adopt it.
Furthermore, if properly utilized, the colorable claim standard for deciding
whether to permit personal jurisdiction discovery anticipates the heightened standards
announced in Twombly. This is because the focus under the colorable claim standard is
both on the degree of factual specificity of the plaintiffs threshold case for personal
jurisdiction and the likelihood that discovery will uncover facts relevant to the
jurisdictional question. As a result, courts are likely to deny discovery if the plaintiff's
jurisdictional allegations are speculative, conclusory, or implausible.
Finally, employing magistrates and specialized judges to handle the first step in
the process of determining whether personal jurisdiction is proper in a particular forum
could streamline and make more cost-effective a process that has heretofore been ad
hoc, unpredictable, and uneconomical. This will in turn heed Twombly's mandate that
expense and efficiency be essential factors in judicial decision making.
656 [Vol. 82
